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SOCIALIZING LAW, PRIVATIZING LAW,
MONOPOLIZING LAW, ACCESSING LAW
Stephen C. Yeazell*
I. INTRODUCTION
A society based on the rule of law fails in one of its central
premises if substantial parts of the population lack access to law
enforcement institutions. The United States has made a series of
choices in this regard, not always with a clear sense of their
consequences. Often, in symposiums of this sort, the conversation
about access to justice moves quickly to such matters as funding of
local legal assistance programs and national funding of the Legal
Services Corporation. There are people who have thought deeply
about these questions, and we should listen carefully to their
thoughts. This Article frames its discussion somewhat differently by
sketching some of the choices we have made as a society and
describing, as broadly as possible, the institutions that have arisen in
response to these choices. The Article offers this description in the
hope that it may help us make wise and informed choices about the
specific topic of this symposium, "The Economics of Civil Justice."
II. LOOKING BACK
The first step is to note a tension between the symposium title
("The Economics of Civil Justice") and the subtitle ("How Do
Americans Pay for Lawyers"), a tension that has arisen in the past
one hundred years and most notably in the last fifty. The tension
flows from a fundamental choice we have made-the choice to
socialize the system of criminal law enforcement while privatizing
the system of civil law enforcement. Today we take those choices to
* David G. Price & Dallas P. Price Professor of Law, UCLA School of
Law. I am very grateful for the help of the Hugh & Hazel Darling Law Library
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be so self-evident that we rarely contemplate their implications. This
Article aims to spur reflection by taking us back about a hundred and
fifty years, to the latter part of the nineteenth century.
A. Socializing Criminal Justice
1. Development of a Public Prosecution System
Until late into the nineteenth century, most criminal
prosecutions were undertaken by private parties; the participation of
state prosecutors was unusual.' That circumstance was not
surprising because the system, like today's civil system, depended
almost entirely on individual initiative-a complainant filing and
pressing a charge.2 Looking at these cases, we should not wrongly
extrapolate from current conditions, imagining that prosecutions
occurred only when the police had conducted an investigation but
decided not to proffer charges. Rather, this was a world in which
police forces were nascent organizations. 3 Government paid judges
and built courthouses, but left it largely to individual citizens to
decide whether and how to invoke these officers of the law. The
results were interesting, even startling, from the perspective of the
twenty-first century. A well-documented survey of the system of
litigation in nineteenth-century Philadelphia reveals its poorer
citizens enthusiastically invoking the criminal process against each
other, often for relatively petty offences that might not attract the
resources or attention of public authorities today.4  The
overwhelming majority of these private prosecutions did not involve
1. See generally Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea
Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal
History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568 (1984) (discussing the transformation of
American criminal justice in the nineteenth century from a system dominated
by private prosecution to assumption of power by the district attorney). Great
Britain underwent a roughly parallel set of developments. See JOHN H.
LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 4 (2003).
2. See ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
38 (1989).
3. See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165,
1182 (1999).
4. See Allen Steinberg, "The Spirit of Litigation": Private Prosecution
and Criminal Justice in Nineteenth Century Philadelphia, 20 J. Soc. HIST. 231,
234 (1986).
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lawyers at all.5 Rather, they were brought before municipal courts in
which both the prosecutor and the defendant represented
themselves. 6 Moreover, the system proved remarkably accessible to
poor litigants:
By all accounts, the... system did not prevent anyone from
participating in this criminal justice relationship. Grand
jurors, judges, and journalists frequently commented on the
ease with which the poorest of Philadelphians, and those
otherwise excluded from public life, made use of this
system. Journalists headed stories on criminal cases with
titles like "the colored people love the law;" judges chided
men for initiating prosecutions for assault and battery,
calling the use of the law "the course of women and
children."
7
Not surprisingly, a number of these private prosecutions were
based on weak grounds; indeed, one of the prime functions of
nineteenth-century grand juries was to weed out weak cases. 8 Put in
terms of this symposium, the chief complaint registered by officials
was that the downtrodden had too much "access" to this form of
justice.9
This world has vanished. First in the big cities, then in smaller
towns, we invested public funds both in police and in professional
public prosecutors. Today, publicly funded prosecutors enjoy a
monopoly on decisions about whether, how, and whom to prosecute.
One regularly reads bitter complaints from victims and their families
that the prosecutor has refused to prosecute or has invoked too light a
charge.' We have socialized both the costs and the control of the
5. See STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 38.
6. See Steinberg, supra note 4, at 236, 240.
7. Steinberg, supra note 1, at 574.
8. See Steinberg, supra note 4, at 239; Steinberg, supra note 1, at 573.
This is a function the grand jury performed well, rejecting what by modem
standards is an astounding percentage of the cases filed. Steinberg, supra note
1, at 573-74.
9. An 1848 court reporter marveled at how "the miserable outcasts of
society" raced to the aldermen over their petty quarrels, "each
endeavoring to... have their opponents arrested before they were
taken into custody themselves," and in so doing "expend... the
greatest portion of the money that falls by accident within their grasp."
Steinberg, supra note 1, at 575.
10. See, e.g., James Gill, Wreckage of Justice, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 4,
August 20061
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criminal process. Moreover, the best-known reforms of the twentieth
century exacerbated rather than ameliorated this trend. Two great
changes reshaped criminal process between 1940 and 2000. Courts
imposed controls on police and prosecutorial behavior through a
series of interpretations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments
to the Federal Constitution.1' We also extended the socialization of
the criminal process by requiring that the state provide legal
representation to indigent felony defendants. 12 Both developments
made the criminal process fairer, though critics continue, rightly, to
insist that much remains to be done. Both developments also
focused on the "objects" of criminal justice-the defendant-rather
than on its purported beneficiaries-the victims and the general
public. Combined, the two developments made bureaucrats of the
operators of criminal justice. In a typical criminal trial, everyone in
the courtroom is a government employee, and the question at issue is
whether the defendant should also become an involuntary ward of
the state. Criminal law itself threatens to become a specialized
branch of administrative law. We often come close to losing sight of
the goals of this social investment: protecting the public; making the
conditions of life of our most vulnerable fellow citizens less violent
and more predictable; and, establishing the conditions of order that
made it possible for children to thrive, and for people to play a full
role in civil society. For substantial portions of our population today,
it is not clear that those conditions exist.
2. The Impact of the Public Prosecution System
To recount these changes is not to suggest that we should return
to a world of private prosecution. A world in which public
2002, at B7 (pointing out that explanations offered by the District Attorney for
their failure to prosecute did not in any way satisfy the victim's family); Pearl
Stewart, Lawsuit Filed Over Killing In Vallejo, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 13, 1989, at
E23 ("[A]ttomey for [the victim's family] said 'There is no logical reason for
their (county prosecutors') failure to prosecute. I am mystified."').
11. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (finding that
the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy "represents a
fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage"); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966) (setting forth a series of procedural safeguards that
law enforcement must follow in order to protect an individual's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel).
12. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963).
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authorities assume responsibility for criminal justice is almost
certainly safer and fairer than that of the nineteenth century. But we
ought to reflect on how these changes affect the broader topic of this
symposium--"Access To Justice." The focus of such an inquiry
comes properly to rest on society's weakest, poorest, and least
powerful. Invocation of the criminal, rather than the civil, process is
attractive to this part of society for several reasons. First, the
criminal process offers a more powerful sanction. If one can
credibly threaten me with jail rather than a civil judgment, I may be
prepared to come to terms with my accuser much more readily. This
possibility is especially likely if I am poor enough that my assets
offer little on which to execute a civil judgment.
There are signs that those invoking criminal law through private
prosecution in the nineteenth century clearly understood this point.
13
That understanding gave great leverage to the private parties who
prosecuted. This leverage seems to have been especially important
to the poor, who enthusiastically used the processes of criminal
justice to bring both major crimes and smaller matters to a public
forum.' 4 Because the private prosecutor (usually the victim of the
crime) controlled the decision to bring and to drop charges, a
settlement that satisfied the prosecutor-victim was often the
outcome. 15 Today, it is black letter law that a threat to invoke
criminal prosecution if one does not make good on a civil claim is
extortion. In a world of private prosecution, if the civil and the
criminal charges were parallel, this proposition became a dead letter.
Accordingly, many parties would have been able to use criminal
prosecution as a tool for settlement, a tool whose power was blunted
only by the ability of the grand jury to dismiss the most outrageous
charges.
Second, private prosecution gives "access to justice" in another
way. It allows people to identify and prosecute the offenses most
salient to them. Those offenses will not always be the ones that
society views with the greatest alarm. Today, big city police
13. See Steinberg, supra note 1, at 572-73.
14. See id. at 575.
15. See David Sklansky & Stephen Yeazell, Comparative Law Without
Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and
Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 3, on file with
authors).
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departments and scholars of criminology debate "community
policing" and the "broken window" approach to law enforcement,
16
which advocates swift response to relatively minor crimes. The
theory is that such action prevents minor offenses from becoming the
precursor to more serious crimes.' 7 I do not propose to enter into
those debates, except to note one change. Today, a shift of police or
prosecutorial resources involves large political battles and the
mobilization of consistent political pressure.' 8 Wealthy communities
inhabited by political elites do not take kindly to having patrol cars
diverted from their neighborhoods to graffiti patrols in poor sections
of the city. 9 In the world before the socialization of criminal justice,
victims had the power to make some of these decisions. They did
not need to convince a police chief or a district attorney to drop
murder charges and go after unruly, drunken neighbors; they could
do so themselves. Markets (if I can refer to peoples' willingness to
invest their own time in prosecution as a "market"), not politics,
determined where prosecutorial resources would be invested. This
kind of "access to justice" has disappeared today.
Again, let me be clear about the nature of my thesis. This is not
a call for a return to the nineteenth century. Publicly supported
police and prosecution produce a fairer, more peaceful, and better
world than that sketched above. But our collective decision to
16. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
17. See Jim Newton, Rewriting the Rules on How to Fight Crime, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1996, at Al.
18. Id. (noting that while community policing enjoys widespread
acceptance, some are uncertain whether it will be effective in reducing crime in
Los Angeles, or how its effectiveness will be gauged).
19. Compare John Schwada, Alatorre Urges Plan to Deploy Officers, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1995, at B 1 (reporting a demand by councilman Alatorre that
the police department change the formula by which officers are assigned to
patrol), and Raymond L. Johnson, Jr. & Ramona Ripston, Police Deployment
Formula Must Address Racial Imbalances, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1988, at B 11
("Of 18 LAPD divisions, the three with the highest percentage of available
patrol time are the three with the highest percentages of white residents. In
those divisions officers spend half their time watching for trouble before it
happens."), with George Gasc6n, Los Angeles Police Department,
COMPSTAT Plus, http://www.lapdonline.org/organization/oo/compstat-plus
.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2006) (discussing the use of Compstat, a crime
statistic management program, used in part to determine high crime areas and
appropriate patrol personnel deployment to such areas).
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socialize criminal justice has implications, and perhaps obligations.
With socialization has come monopolization. A government
monopoly has a moral, and probably a legal, obligation to exercise
that monopoly responsibly. We may not be doing so. Poor people
20want more policing. Access to justice entails protection against
unlawful evictions, predatory lending, and more. First, though, it
entails protection against random violence and drive-by shootings.
Citizens' claims for protection from violence are particularly great
when government has taken the most obvious means of self-help
from them, by monopolizing the machinery of the criminal process.
Those more imaginative than I can think about how one might frame
such a claim and whether a political process or litigation pressure
would be more effective. I only suggest that those whose concern is
access to justice keep in mind this broader perspective, and that we
should not confine attention to the current forms of civil justice.
B. Privatizing Civil Justice
The obligation to broaden our view becomes stronger when we
understand that the civil justice system headed in a direction opposite
that of the criminal justice system. Where criminal justice in the
United States socialized in the twentieth century, civil justice
privatized. It did so not in a great burst of purposeful activity but in
a series of steps that included procedural reform, bar deregulation,
and changes in financing-all of which interacted with exogenous
developments in economic life.2'
20. Good standard polling data on this point is elusive; most polls ask about
generalized support for or dislike of police. See, e.g., CATHERINE GALLAGHER
ET AL., ADMIN. OF JUSTICE PROGRAM, GEO. MASON UNIV., THE PUBLIC IMAGE
OF THE POLICE, available at http://www.marcpi.jhu.edu/marcpi/Ethics/
ethicsjtoolkit/publicjimage.htm. But one can find scattered and confirming
data from actual voting patterns. In 1981 and 1985, when the citizens of Los
Angeles faced a ballot initiative that would have raised taxes to pay for more
police, the initiative was defeated, except in South Central Los Angeles, the
poorest portion of the city. See Victor Merina, South-Central Tax Would Beef
up Police, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1987, at Metro 1; cf. LOU CANNON, OFFICIAL
NEGLIGENCE: How RODNEY KING AND THE RIOTS CHANGED Los ANGELES
AND THE LAPD 17-18 (1997) (noting the consistent support South Central
voters give to ballot measures that raise taxes to pay for additional police
officers or better police equipment); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT
CRIME 103-05 (1975) (describing how multiple surveys indicate that people
want additional and better police).
21. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked For, Getting What We
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1. Procedural Reform
The first major step in procedural reform was the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Many have written of the
Rules' genesis and of the choices that were made. 2 For present
purposes the most significant aspect of the Rules is that they
essentially privatized fact investigation through their creation of a
discovery process. Before the Rules (and the analogous state
procedures that began to adopt the "Rules" model over the next few
23decades), a litigant could often compel testimony or obtain a
document only by filing suit, bringing the case to trial and employing
a trial subpoena to get the witness or document.24 Under such
circumstances one can say two things. First, trial served as a means
of discovery, rather than the result of discovery. Today, litigants
discover in order to prepare for (or avoid) trial. In the world before
discovery, things stood upside down and trial was often the only
means of discovery. 5 Speaking in the first decade of the twentieth
century, Moorfield Storey, a prominent Boston lawyer and early civil
rights champion, estimated that less than one in three civil cases went
to trial.26 A few decades later, on the eve of the Federal Rules'
adoption, much more elaborate statistical compilation indicated that
about one in five federal civil cases ended in trial.2 7 Today, the
figures are fractions of those numbers, with recent estimates
Paid For, and Not Liking What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943, 954-56 (2004).
22. See, e.g., Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 1938-1988, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1873 (1989) (describing
twenty of the country's leading proceduralists discuss, assess, and question the
Federal Rules).
23. About thirty-five states have formally adopted the federal rules as their
state procedural codes. John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in
State Courts, 3 NEv. L.J. 354, 356-58 (2003). Even those states (California,
Illinois, and New York) that maintain distinct procedural systems have adopted
the essential characteristics of the federal system: relaxed pleading, broad
joinder, substantial pretrial discovery leading to summary judgment, and a
relatively broad scope for res judicata. As a consequence, their civil justice
systems display the same trends as those based on formal adoption of the
federal rules.
24. Yeazell, supra note 21, at 949.
25. Id. at951.
26. MooRFIELD STOREY, THE REFORM OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 26 (1911).
27. Yeazell, supra note 21, at 955.
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28indicating that only two percent of federal cases go to trial. One
cannot attribute all this change to the institution of discovery, but
discovery has to be part of the story.29  Discovery produces
information, in light of which the parties may decide to settle.
Discovery also imposes costs, which brings us squarely to the theme
of privatization.
Discovery empowers litigants. In a civil law system litigants
can only attempt to persuade a judge to seek information from the
parties or others. American law, on the other hand, allows the
litigants to demand information and testimony and backs those
demands with legal sanctions. From such a comparative standpoint,
the power delegated to ordinary litigants by the American discovery
system is astounding. Ordinary civil litigants receive state sanction
to require documents, depose witnesses under oath, and more. The
penalties for noncompliance are substantial, including not only
consequences to a litigant within the lawsuit, but also extending to
possible imprisonment or fines of non-party witness who fail to
comply. We have put in the hands of civil litigants powers that in
many legal systems only state officials enjoy.30 To so note is not to
criticize our choices; understanding these powers is important if we
wish to understand access to justice.
2. Modem Discovery, Implications for Access
Because discovery is technical, studded with evidentiary and
similar objections and with a fairly elaborate set of steps, litigants
need lawyers to deploy the system. Moreover, discovery is no longer
merely an optional matter, as one might have thought in the first few
decades following the advent of the system. Hickman v. Taylor,
3 1
the first U.S. Supreme Court case dealing directly with discovery, so
described it using terms suggesting that it was both optional32 and no
28. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD.
459, 459 (2004).
29. See Yeazell, supra note 21, at 948-49.
30. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1665, 1675 (1998); Gerald Walpin, American's Failing Civil Justice
System: Can We Learn From Other Countries?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 647,
649 (1997).
31. 329 U.S. 495 (1947), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 26(b)(3).
32. See id. at 504.
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more than a somewhat accelerated presentation of evidence that
would in any case emerge at trial: "The deposition-discovery
procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be
compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus
reducing the possibility of surprise." 33 That description, while not
false, omits two central elements, both of which bear on access to
civil justice. First, precisely because the scope of discovery is
broader than the scope of admissible evidence, it allows parties to
cast their nets more broadly. Parties typically accept the invitation,
to the point where modem discussions of discovery often center on
whether it is abused.34 This opportunity also entails expense, as it
takes longer to sift through large quantities of evidence and to
conduct hours of depositions looking for the nugget of information
that will be admissible evidence. Simply put, the opportunities
presented by modem discovery have a dynamic of their own. That
dynamic requires substantial investment of pretrial lawyer time and,
quite possibly, the retention of expert witnesses, who often require
fees. So, the availability of discovery creates a pressure for greater
and earlier investment by the litigants.
35
Moreover, a second doctrinal development turned the
opportunities of pretrial discovery into an obligation. In 1986, the
U.S. Supreme Court said that a litigant who fails to employ
discovery to build a basic case will suffer summary judgment.36
States have generally followed suit.37 The power to use discovery
33. Id. at 507.
34. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Second Report of the Special Committee For the
Study of Discovery Abuse, 92 F.R.D. 137, 141-42 (1980) (recommending
limits on the scope of discovery, limits on the number of interrogatories, and
requirements for a discovery conference). The Civil Rules Advisory
Committee in the late 1970s initially supported all three suggestions and
published draft rules containing the narrowed scope of discovery. See Comm.
on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 77
F.R.D. 613 (1978); see also Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery
for the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 TuL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 153, 162 (1999).
35. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L.
REv. 183, 194 (2001).
36. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
37. See, e.g., CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 437c(p) (West 2005) (effective July
1, 2005) (codifying Celotex's incorporation of burden of production in
summary judgment motions).
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tools well before trial has become a duty. Moreover, the duty is one
that falls on the litigant rather than on the public's shoulders. In the
world before the current discovery regime, the period before trial
required relatively little investment because there was little to invest
in. 8 With discovery and the rise of expert witnesses, there arises far
more opportunity, and now, requirement for pretrial investment.
39
We have privatized the fact investigation phase of civil litigation, by
delegating what were once judicial powers to private hands. Such
delegation allows litigants to probe facts and uncover uncomfortable
truths that state officials might be reluctant to dirty their hands
with. ° In the context of U.S. civil justice, however, privatization
increased the investment required by litigants with no accompanying
subsidy.
3. A Path Not Taken
This latter point requires reiteration because it points to a path
not taken. During the New Deal, the United States saw major public
investments in a variety of social programs. These programs
included not only Social Security, the largest and most expensive
government program, but also substantial new federal regulatory
agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
National Labor Relations Board. These investments often reflected
new substantive law, but they also represented implicit subsidies to
private civil litigation. When, for example, the SEC investigates
securities law violations, its staff does part of the spadework for
follow-on civil litigation. A similar pattern applies to criminal
antitrust prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice. Today,
if such investigations result in filed cases, they often produce follow-
on civil suits.41  Indeed, some have criticized the civil bar for
sometimes depending too heavily on such investigations. 42 For our
38. See Marcus, supra note 34, at 159.
39. See Yeazell, supra note 35, at 193-98.
40. See generally KUO-CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO
CivIL LAW (2003) (alleging that civil law regimes typically under-investigate
claims because judges, who control the investigatory phase, lack incentives to
probe deeply).
41. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 395
(1981) (private civil suits following Justice Department antitrust filings);
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 324 (1979) (private securities
suit following SEC enforcement action regarding misleading proxy statement).
42. See, e.g., Linda A. Willett, Litigation as an Alternative to Regulation:
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purposes, these instances, which today represent a small fraction of
the national resources invested in fact investigation, suggest one way
civil litigation could have developed-but did not. That way might
have led to substantial public resources invested in factual
investigations, one of whose products might have been private civil
litigation. For that to have happened, the New Deal would have had
to produce a far broader footprint, that included state and local
governments, than it did even at its height.
One can see the faint shadow of such a possibility in police
reports that used to be prepared and filed after traffic accidents. A
generation ago, a significant accident on a public road generated a
visit from the police, who then prepared and filed an accident report
concerning the basic facts. Sometimes litigants introduced those
reports into evidence; other times, they provided the starting point
for the investigation that accompanied civil litigation. Thus, to some
extent, the police were subsidizing civil litigation as a byproduct of
their investigation. As an immediate focus, the police were
concerned with issuing citations for infractions of traffic laws. As a
more long-range effect, police investigations led to changes in road
design or markings (e.g., if a given location seemed to produce more
than its share of accidents). Today, anecdotal information and some
official pronouncements suggest that police in urban areas have
ceased to respond to such calls unless they involve serious injury or
death.43 Instead, the participants in the accident must file the
reports, 44 which therefore lack the neutrality of an official
investigation. From the perspective of this Article, the authorities
have, to that extent, withdrawn the former subsidy. Given other
concerns, particularly those of violent crime, it is hard to criticize
Problems Created by Follow-On Lawsuits with Multiple Outcome, 18 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 1477, 1491 (2005) (raising several concerns with follow-on
lawsuits).
43. See, e.g., Los Angeles Police Dep't Traffic/Vehicle-Related Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.lapdonline.org/general information/faqs/
trafficrelated.htm (last visited Dec. 06, 2005), (informing a visitor that an
accident report must be filed in many circumstances with the Department of
Motor Vehicles, but it is the Police Department's policy to take such a report
only if: someone is injured or dies; one of the drivers is under the influence of
alcohol or drugs; one of the drivers has fled the scene; or City property (traffic
signal, lamp-post, sign, etc.) is involved).
44. See CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 20004, 20008 (West 2000).
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this "re-privatization" of traffic accident investigations. I offer it
instead as a homely reminder of a road not taken.
Instead of socializing the costs of civil litigation, we have
privatized them. Fact investigation, formal and informal discovery,
and the cost of increasingly prevalent expert testimony all rest on the
shoulders of civil litigants. These circumstances pose a challenge for
access to civil justice. If civil litigants had to shoulder these costs,
and if there were no financing mechanisms, one could reasonably say
that no effective access to civil justice would exist for most of the
population. In fact, the U.S. bar has responded with a combination
of entrepreneurial ingenuity, very modest public subsidy, and
significant deregulation. The result is a network of litigation finance
possibilities that cover many-though not all-of the civil legal
difficulties in which individuals find themselves.45 A brief catalog
will serve as a prelude to a pair of suggestions about repairing the
holes that discussions of access to justice sometimes overlook.
To set the context for this discussion, recall an elemental truth.
In our legal system, judgment-proof clients-the intended
beneficiaries of most discussions of access to justice-are sued in
only two circumstances: (1) if, in spite of their indigence, they
possess significant non-liquid assets, or (2) if a judgment is
necessary to effect some other change in circumstances. These two
situations describe the two most prolific areas in which civil
defendants may need lawyers: unlawful detainer actions and divorce
or custody determinations. In the first, the tenant/defendant
possesses an illiquid asset-the property-that the landlord wants
back. In the second, even if the parties agree to a divorce, they must
have a judgment to that effect, and, if children are involved, a decree
establishing custody.46  Such cases overwhelm legal aid
organizations in the United States, to the point that many of them
have resorted to "self-help" clinics in both areas,47 reserving their
45. See Yeazell, supra note 35 at 212-15.
46. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2338 (West 2005) (requiring the entry of a
judgment by the court for a dissolution of marriage or legal separation); see
also id. §§ 3421-3422 (establishing the court's jurisdiction over child custody
proceedings).
47. See, e.g., IOLTA INFO. SERVS. & SONOMA COUNTY LEGAL AID,
SHAC: THE FIRST SIX MONTHS (2001), http://www.calegaladvocates.org
(search for "SHAC"; then follow the "HTM" hyperlink under "SHAC: The
First Six Months").
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resources for the most unusual or most egregious situations, such as
those involving domestic violence or particularly outrageous
landlord behavior.
48
I shall return to these two situations, particularly to the former,
but it is important to bear firmly in mind that self-interest provides
most indigent defendants with an unfortunate sort of "insurance"
against civil litigation. Simply put, it is not worth suing them. That
circumstance may explain the courts' reluctance to find the civil
equivalent of Gideon v. Wainwright49  in state or federal
constitutions-that is, the right of counsel to indigent civil litigants.
50
A court might thus understandably think, when faced with a
controversial opinion that would order the reallocation of scarce
public resources, that a "civil Gideon" might fall low on its list of
priorities.
Having briefly and cavalierly dealt with potential parties on the
right hand side of the "v" in civil litigation, I want to examine with
slightly more detail the situation for potential civil plaintiffs. This
group has benefited most from the ingenuity and the changes in the
structure of the bar. For civil plaintiffs whose remedy involves
damages, we have done the best job, not because of thoughtfully
devised programs, but because self-interest has combined with
deregulation. The contingent fee, a peculiarly American
phenomenon, gets us part way there. By pooling the fortunes of
plaintiff-clients, contingent fee lawyers aggregate their risks and
justify investment of their time and various out-of-pocket
48. For example, the Housing/Eviction Defense Services unit of the Legal
Aid Foundation of Los Angeles offers pro per training and preparation in
eviction trials and legal representation "where possible." Legal Aid
Foundation of Los Angeles, Housing/Eviction Defense Services,
http://www.lafla.org/clientservices/housing/houserve.asp (last visited Jan. 5,
2006). The Family and Children's Law Center similarly assists clients in filing
forms and proceed pro se, and provides representation only in "selected cases."
American Bar Association, Innovative Programs to Help People of Modest
Means Obtain Legal Help,
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/delivery/delmodesthelp.html (last visited
Jan. 2, 2006).
49. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
50. For a recent example, see Frase v. Barnhart, 840 A.2d 114 (Md. 2003),
where the court declined, on procedural grounds, to decide whether the
Maryland state constitution guaranteed appointment of counsel to parents
facing loss of custody in an action brought by the state.
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expenditures. 5 1 In turn, the lawyer offers the winners a fee larger
than they would have received had they not been willing to cross-
subsidize the losers. 52  By all accounts, the vast majority of
individuals with personal injury claims are willing to make such a
trade, even when explicitly offered an hourly fee basis.
53
But the contingent fee provides only part of the solution. In the
high pre-trial investment climate of U.S. civil litigation, a contingent
fee practitioner can muster the capital necessary to make rationally
high investments in civil litigation only if one of three conditions are
met. The first possibility is that the lawyer has the rare luxury of
choosing from a great number of clients and is sufficiently good at
case-selection that she can have a small portfolio of nearly-certain
winners. There are a few such lawyers, but they are as rare as the
small investors who reliably pick the equivalent of Microsoft in the
initial public offering market. Although those advocating damage
caps and other changes in tort law emphasize such lawyers, their
numbers are so small as to constitute statistical noise, and I shall
ignore them for purposes of this discussion.
The two other groups are significant in size. One consists of the
firm (usually small-perhaps two to twenty lawyers) 54 that
diversifies its practice. As Herbert Kritzer's recently published book
on contingent fee practice illustrates, many of these practices spread
risks by diversifying across lines of practice. 55 In such a model, the
firm takes some low-paying but reliable cases, such as workers'
compensation, to assure a steady flow of income.56 It also takes
some cases with higher risks but greater payouts, typified by
personal injury cases. Finally, at the high-risk end of this type of
51. See Yeazell, supra note 35, at 212-15.
52. See id.
53. For example, New Jersey requires all lawyers who might work on a
contingent fee basis explicitly to offer clients the alternative of an hourly rate.
N.J. R. CT. 1:21-7(b).
54. Statistically speaking, the median size of the practice group for U.S.
lawyers, even those practicing in large urbanized states like California, is
relatively small: thirty percent work in 2-5 person firms and twenty-seven
percent work in 6-20 person firms. RICHARD HERTZ CONSULTING, FINAL
REPORT: CALIFORNIA BAR JOURNAL SURVEY 6 (2001), available at
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/cbj/2001-CBJ-Survey-Summary.pdf.
55. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS:
CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (2004).
56. Id. at 15.
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practice might come a product liability case. Such a case requires a
very high investment in discovery and experts, but might also yield
high rewards, both in fees and reputation.57 The second form of
diversification is more akin to index fund investing. This type of
lawyer specializes in, for example, personal injury litigation, but
accepts a broad array of such cases, enough so that the gains will
balance the losses. Both forms yield a diversified "portfolio" of
cases. 58 That diversification balances risks and rewards to enable the
lawyer to make as large an investment in any individual case as is
rationally justified.
For one concerned about access to justice, these changes to
contingent fee practice mark an important change for the plaintiffs'
bar. Forty years ago, Jerome Carlin chronicled the travails of some
members of this group.59  It was not a happy picture.
Undercapitalized, often undereducated, and frequently out-
60lawyered, these lawyers provided an "access to justice" that was
sometimes a snare and a delusion. Their successors, by and large,
are doing a much better job. In part this is because they have
reorganized themselves in ways that provide much better services to
their clients.61 As the quality of their services has increased, so have
their incomes. 6 2 One of Kritzer's interesting findings is that the
incomes of the contingent fee bar essentially match those of the
defense bar.63 This finding is of enormous consequence for those
concerned about access to justice. It means that both sides in
ordinary litigation have the resources to make economically rational
investments in litigation. The defendant cannot credibly threaten to
grind the plaintiff into the ground by out-spending him so long as the
plaintiff's lawyer can match those expenditures up to the point where
economic rationality causes them to stop of their own accord.
The response on the defense side has been predictable. Once the
tactic of threatening to "spend them to death" lost its credibility,
57. See id. at 13-15.
58. See id. at 11-16.
59. JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN: A STUDY OF
INDIVIDUAL PRACTITIONERS IN CHICAGO (1962).
60. Id. at 17-18.
61. See Yeazell, supra note 21, at 956-57.
62. See id. at 957 n.37.
63. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency
Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 279-80 (1997).
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insurance carriers began to put their counsel under increasingly tight
cost constraints. 64  Insurers have brought some counsel in house,
creating captive law firms.65  Outside counsel operate under
increasingly tight letters of engagement, requiring specific
authorization to engage in any steps beyond the most minimally
required.66 For example, many insurance engagement letters require
authorization to file a motion, take a deposition, or engage an
expert-essentially anything that would run up the expenses of the
suit. Plaintiffs' counsel are aware of these constraints, just as
defense counsel know that their contingent fee adversaries are paying
expenses out of their own pockets. Changes in the plaintiffs' bar
have thus distributed resources as well as knowledge, far more
evenly than in the preceding generation. No sane person would
claim that the playing field is completely level, but its slope has
diminished dramatically. This change creates better access to justice,
not because of increased public subsidies, but because of a more
efficient market in legal services.
For this system to work, however, the legal profession had to
adapt in several ways. Some I have already noted: increased modal
firm size and consequently better capitalization and some
specialization. 67 That system would still not suffice unless there was
an efficient brokerage system that delivered cases to lawyers who
possessed the intellectual and financial capital to maximize their
potential. This is not a small problem. Clients who are generally the
focus of access to justice discussions are, for the most part,
quintessentially unsophisticated consumers of legal services. 61 Most
will have little or no experience with lawyers and will lack the means
to evaluate their competency to handle specific cases. What is
necessary is a market in claims that would create incentives for the
64. See Yeazell, supra note 21, at 959.
65. See, e.g., William T. Barker, Laying the Foundation For Staff Counsel
Representation of Insureds, 39 ToRT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 897 (2004)
(surveying law on the subject and recommending best practices to avoid
unauthorized practice charges); Gary Young, Key States Scrutinize 'Captive
Law Firms,' NAT'L L.J., June 17, 2002, at A13 (reporting a California Court of
Appeal ruling "that insurers using staff counsel are not engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law").
66. Yeazell, supra note 21, at 959.
67. Id. at 957-58.
68. See Yeazell, supra note 35, at 202.
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lawyer who came into first contact with the client to get the case into
the hands of another lawyer with the ability to maximize its potential.
For a long time, the bar sought to forbid such a market by banning
referral fees. 69  Whatever the formal status of such bans, most
observers today agree that attorneys widely ignore them-to the
advantage of the clients. Recent studies of the functioning of such a
referral market reveal an active and efficient market.70 In this
market, lawyers lacking expertise or capital refer large or specialized
cases up the chain to prominent plaintiffs' lawyers. The referring
lawyers expect (and get) reciprocal referrals of cases requiring less
specialized legal skills or smaller investments of capital.71  The
incentives are those of self-interest. Parikh reports that attorneys
along the chain benefit by achieving "elite" status within the legal
community including maintaining a "distance from the ambulance
chasing and undignified advertising of those who occupy lower
positions in the subprofession's hierarchy."
72
While Parikh studied solely the Chicago bar, anecdotal evidence
suggests that something similar, though perhaps not quite so
efficient, operates in Los Angeles.73 Nationally, the American Trial
Lawyers Association (ATLA), the trade group for the plaintiffs'
bar,7  publishes referral directories the size of the Manhattan
telephone book and conducts national and regional seminars. These
activities have as an implicit purpose the creation of a national
referral network.75 There is a reason to believe that it functions
relatively well for those cases in which economic incentives are in
69. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 511 (practitioner's
ed. 1986) ("[T]he lawyer codes regulate fee splitting in ways that the practice
of forwarding fees offends in spirit if not literally.").
70. Sara Parikh & Bryant Garth, Philip Corboy and the Construction of the
Plaintiffs' Personal Injury Bar, 30 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 269, 281 (2005)
(drawing on Parikh's longer and more detailed research for her doctoral
dissertation).
71. See id. at 299.
72. Id.
73. Interview with Thomas Girardi, Girardi and Keese, in L.A., Cal. (Fall
2004).
74. See About ATLA, http://www.atla.org/about/index.aspx (last visited
Feb. 3, 2006).
75. See ATLA Practice Sections, Special Benefits Available Only to
Section Members (sidebar), http://www.atla.org/sections (last visited Feb. 3,
2006).
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operation, a category that excludes a number of cases, to which I
now turn.
III. WHO Is LEFF OUTSIDE THE NEW ECONOMY OF JUSTICE?
The contingent fee market only functions if there are damages
from which attorneys can collect fees. If no money changes hands,
nothing drives the market. The contingent fee market thus eliminates
cases seeking an injunction or similar order. Such cases constitute an
enormous hole in the privatized system of access to law.
The largest group of such cases involves divorce and custody
76adjudications. One cannot get a binding divorce or child custody
adjustments without a judicial decree. 77  And, divorce is a big
business for U.S. courts. In 2001, the most recent year for which
complete statistics are available, the National Center for State Courts
reported that fourteen percent of the non-traffic filings, about 5.3
78million cases, fell into their "domestic" category, which includes
divorces, property division, and child custody adjudications. 79 This
category exhibited the largest growth in filings over the preceding
fifteen years. It expanded by seventy-nine percent between 1984 and
2000, more than twice the growth rate in general civil filings, nearly
twice the growth rate of criminal filings, and about a third more than
juvenile filings. 80  Several circumstances give this group of cases
special claim in any discussion of access to justice. First, like
criminal law, divorce is a state monopoly. People can, without resort
to legal process, decide to live together or apart, but once married,
they cannot divorce without judicial action. Where the state creates a
76. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS, 2002, at 35 (Brian J. Ostrom et al. eds., 2003), available at
http://ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/2002_Files/2002_DomRelations.pdf.
Support and custody cases are the most prevalent in limited jurisdiction courts.
Id. Contingency fees are typically not available for these types of family law
matters. Findlaw.com, Hiring a Family Law Attorney: Types of Legal Fees,
http://family.findlaw.com/divorce/divorce-help/family-lawyer-fees.html (last
visited Feb. 3, 2006).
77. See supra text accompanying note 46.
78. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 76, at 10 tbl., available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/2002_Files/2002_Overview.pdf.
79. Id. at 35 tbl., available at http://ncsconline.org/D-Research/csp/
2002_Files/2002_DomRelations.pdf.
80. See id. at 1 app., available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/
csp/2002_Files/2002_OverviewGraphics.pdf.
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monopoly, it has an obligation to create reasonable access to this
necessary service. That is particularly so when the monopoly in
question involves a basic unit of social life, the family. Moreover, in
contemporary American society, divorce often exacerbates the
former family unit's economic problems, which correlate with
women's and children's poverty.8 1 Divorce thus represents an often
disruptive and traumatic event in the lives of persons at the edge of
poverty.
Despite its prevalence and impact, divorce is an event with
which the existing legal services network does not deal well. One
can start with the legal aid establishment-the publicly funded
offices that offer legal services to indigent clients. One can
confidently predict that even if these offices dramatically expanded
their services, they could serve only half of the demand because they
would be conflicted out of representing fifty percent of the clients.
The spouse who got to the office first would preclude that office's
representation of the other spouse.
In an imaginary universe, one could approach this problem by
creating an "alternative" office, as the public criminal defense bar
does to deal with conflicts, 82 or by hiring retained counsel at public
expense. Yet neither happens, in part, because if we are honest with
ourselves, this is not an area of law that attracts much enthusiasm or
interest even from those most dedicated to legal assistance. Few
seeking careers in legal aid imagine themselves dealing with a steady
diet of divorce cases. Legal aid offices reflect this situation. A
representative Web site, that of the Legal Aid Foundation of Los
Angeles (LAFLA), lists a "Family Law" section, but closer scrutiny
indicates that the foundation offers assistance only for issues of
"child abduction," "child custody," and "domestic violence." 83 For a
81. Thomas L. Hanson et al., Windows on Divorce: Before and After, 27
Soc. Sci. RES. 329, 346 (1998) (noting that parental divorce is associated with
declines in economic resources, especially for women and children).
82. See MAREA L. BEEMAN & JAMES DOWNING, SPANGENBERG GROUP,
RATES OF COMPENSATION FOR COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL IN CAPITAL
CASES AT TRIAL: A STATE-BY-STATE OvERvIEw, 2003, at 3 (2003), available
at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/
compensationratescapital2003.pdf (noting a continuing trend toward creating
"specialized statewide capital trial units").
83. Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, Family Law, http://www.lafla
.org/clientservices/family/index.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
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divorce not involving such issues, the foundation offers only a page
of general advice concerning deadlines and the unhelpful statement
that a "regular dissolution is complicated and time consuming. If
you cannot afford an attorney to help you, you should at least seek
experienced help in filling out the necessary court papers ....,84
One cannot fault LAFLA and similar organizations for devoting
resources to the most pressing cases. Nevertheless, their triage
decisions do not address the legal problem that indigent families are
most likely to confront. Nor are the increasingly important pro bono
efforts by for-profit law firms likely to be helpful. As Scott
Cummings has shown, private pro bono practice has both grown and
stabilized, so that it is a significant part of the picture of access to
civil justice in the twenty-first century. 85 A symposium about access
to justice will ignore such developments only at the peril of
providing a radically incomplete picture of resources. Yet divorce is
an area where it is unlikely that these private resources will provide
any help. Cummings notes several reasons that private firm lawyers
engage in pro bono practice. These motivations range from public
relations and firm marketing to skills-building to expressions of
charitable and ideological impulses. 86 Yet few of these motives are
likely to be satisfied by divorce assistance. Almost no large or mid-
sized firms-those providing the bulk of pro bono efforts-have or
seek to build divorce practices.8 7  As a consequence, divorce
proceedings do not give these firms the opportunity to offer expertise
or gain experience that will be useful in their private practices.
88
Furthermore, the few lawyers who specialize in divorce cannot be
expected to turn their careers into pro bono centers. One cannot then
expect the future to differ significantly from the present.
84. Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, Immediate Help, http://www
.lafla.org/clientservices/family/famemerg.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2005).
85. See Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1,
3-5 (2004).
86. Id. at 33-34.
87. See David Barnhizer, Profession Deleted: Using Market and Liability
Forces to Regulate the Very Ordinary Business of Law Practice for Profit, 17
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 203, 238 (2004).
88. See Cummings, supra note 85 (discussing the role of pro-bono
coordinators in "freeing up other firm lawyers [in order to] play their own
specialized roles").
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More fundamentally, providing access to legal counsel will not
cure the financial problems of divorce. If no one involved has stable
employment, counsel will not provide it. But, there is evidence that
in at least a portion of these cases, one partner, usually the male, has
capacity to pay child support that is either untapped or unenforced.89
Sometimes, one of the partners has non-liquid assets in the form of
future claims on pension or survivors' benefits. These claims must
be identified and secured if the former spouse and children are to
have protection down the road. Better representation would reduce
at least some of the suffering entailed by divorce.
Divorce is one status determination that only a court can make
-where the state monopoly suggests a special obligation to provide
access to law. Citizenship is another. Just over one in nine residents
of the United States was foreign born in 2000, a growth of more than
fifty percent over the preceding decade. 90 Sixty percent of this
group-about nineteen millions persons-are not United States
citizens.91 A considerable portion of the latter group has present or
potential immigration problems. They are either here unlawfully or
they entered lawfully but need to pay fairly regular attention to the
documentation, appearances, and administrative process to maintain
their legal status. 92 Moreover, the principles governing immigration
status are notoriously complex and, some would say, virtually
lawless. As a consequence, no sane person who had a choice would
embark on these seas without expert advice. In this area, traditional
sources of legal assistance-I again use LAFLA only as an
example--offer slightly more help.93 Because immigration status
determinations involve hearings that provide training in basic
89. See Hanson et al., supra note 81, at 331.
90. NOLAN MALONE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE FOREIGN-
BORN POPULATION: 2000, at 3 tbl. 1 (2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-34.pdf.
91. Id.
92. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Guide for New
Immigrants: Your Rights and Responsibilities as a Permanent Resident,
http://uscis.gov/graphics/citizenship/rights.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2006)
(listing the requirements for maintaining legal resident status).
93. Unlike the divorce section of the site, LAFLA purports to offer direct
representation in immigration proceedings. See Legal Aid Foundation of Los
Angeles, Immigration Services, http://www.lafla.org/clientservices/
immigration/immserve.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
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advocacy skills,94 we can expect that private bar pro bono efforts will
provide more help than with divorce proceedings. Demand will still
vastly exceed supply. In a world of scarce legal aid resources,
perhaps citizens should have first claim on those resources. I do not
propose to enter into that debate. My point is more basic: if
government requires resort to adjudication (or its administrative
analogues) in respect to actions that determine a life-critical status
(be it marital or citizenship), this monopoly power obligates the
government to provide access to legal assistance for the indigent.
To take matters one step further, consider that in the United
States at the start of the twenty-first century, divorces may have
significant immigration consequences. For example, a non-citizen
spouse may have her immigration status change as a result of a
95divorce. Or, a child may be threatened with deportation because a
parent is divorced and subsequently loses legal immigration status.
Relief may theoretically be available in these and similar situations,
but only to the counseled. Of the few divorce lawyers able and
willing to handle an indigent divorce, few or none will also have the
expertise to handle the collateral immigration consequences. So long
as our population looks as it does now, both morality and social
policy suggest greater access to counsel in status determination
cases.
IV. IMPLICATIONS: ANOTHER VIEW OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE
If the description above approximates reality, it suggests a
framework for "access to justice" somewhat different from the
typical pleas for more funding for the Legal Services Corporation.
96
As a thought experiment, start with the idea that government should
first provide an adequate supply of services in areas over which
government claims a monopoly. One such area is criminal law and
policing. In the United States today, most poor people live in areas
with much higher rates of crime, particularly of violent crime, than
those at the other end of the income spectrum. According to the U.S.
94. Id.
95. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26-27 (1993).
96. For an example of a request for more funding for the Legal Services
Corporation, see Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, Poor's Legal Needs Not Being
Met: Increased Funding Needed for Legal Services Corporation, American Bar
Association Says (Apr. 19, 1990) (on file with authors).
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Department of Justice, which conducts regular household surveys of
"victimization rates," a person in a family whose household income
is less that $7500 annually (far below the national definition of
poverty)97 is almost three times more likely to be the victim of
violent crime than a someone in a family with more than $75,000 in
income. 98 If one focuses on the most serious category, "completed"
violent crimes, the disparity is even greater: households in the lowest
fourteen percent of income are more than five times as likely to
suffer as households in the highest fourteen percent.
99
If we start with the proposition that governments at all levels
have asserted monopoly control over the operation of criminal justice
in the last century and a half, some interesting entailments follow.
For much of the twentieth century, those who sought "access to law"
in connection with criminal justice focused on the plight of indigent
defendants.100  Formally, that crusade ended with Gideon v.
Wainwright,l0 l but many argue public defense is so poorly funded
that many defendants do not receive assistance from competent
counsel. 102  They are right. But even with a modest historical
perspective, one could argue that poor people in the United States
suffer even more from lack of access to the other end of criminal
justice-policing and prosecution. Monopolists, particularly
government monopolists, have a moral and perhaps a legal duty to
exercise their monopoly power fairly. The crime victimization
statistics could cause one to question whether that power is being
fairly exercised. Answers to that question would involve much
closer scrutiny than I am able to deploy here.
97. For a family of four, the poverty line in 2006 is $20,000. U.S. DEP'T OF
HUMAN SERVS., The 2006 HHS Poverty Guidelines, http://aspe.hhs.gov/
poverty/06poverty.shtml.
98. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2003 STATISTICAL TABLES, at tbl. 14
(2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus03.pdf.
99. See id.
100. See, e.g., AM. BAR. Ass'N, GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT
DEFENSE FUNDING (1982), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
downloads/sclaid/GideonUndone.pdf (discussing the inadequate funding of
services for indigent defendants).
101. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
102. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon's Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
955, 955 (2004); Symposium, Gideon at 40: Facing the Crisis, Fulfilling the
Promise, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 135, 140-41 (2004).
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Let me instead make a not-too-bold assumption that, in many
instances, government is not investing enough in policing and
prosecution in the poorest areas. To rectify that situation-to grant
the poor access to justice-one would have to invest more resources
in criminal justice in poor neighborhoods. That investment would
not be in additional criminal defense, but in additional policing and
prosecution. Again, I am not arguing that we should not invest more
social resources in criminal defense; we should. But additional
police and prosecution have at least as strong a claim on public
resources, given the now century-old decision to make the machinery
of criminal prosecution a government monopoly.
An analogous argument might be made for family law. Though
the often-cited fifty percent divorce rate is likely an overstatement,
10 3
a substantial percentage of marriages in the United States end in
divorce. 1 4 The same data report that the divorce rate is diverging,
with a significantly lower rate for college graduates than for those
with less education-who will, of course, be far more likely to be
poor. 10 5 Consider the circumstances of a poor married couple who
conclude that divorce is necessary. They can separate without
undergoing a divorce, but neither can lawfully remarry. The state
insists that such changes in status pass through its machinery of
justice. Because the family unit appears to play an enormous role in
the perpetuation of the species, developing the human capital of
future generations, when a state asserts monopoly over the
formalization of this status, it must help people who wish to alter it
but lack means to do so. Where children are involved, the state's
obligation seems particularly strong. The increasing involvement of
the state in the family also suggests that with monopoly control
comes the monopolist's obligation to ensure access.
A recent report suggests that even when these two monopolies
flow together, the legal system fails badly. In the summer of 2005,
the Attorney General of our largest state released a report that
excoriated most of the major players in the legal system. 1° 6 The
103. Dan Hurley, Divorce Rate: It's Not As High As You Think, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 2005, at F7 (reporting that demographers estimate the rate to have
leveled off at about 41%).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. ATTORNEY GEN.'S TASK FORCE ON LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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topic was domestic violence and the legal system's response to it.
The basic finding was that many in the system failed to apply or
enforce existing laws. 0 7 Judges were not issuing restraining orders
even when required to do so by applicable law. 10 8 When judges did
issue such orders, the authorities regularly failed to serve them on
those to whom they applied. 10 9 Those orders that were actually
issued and served were frequently not enforced.110 In addition, no
one bothered to track the spouses who were ordered, in connection
with domestic violence, to attend programs designed to change their
behavior, and, as a result, many failed to complete those programs.'
The report, ironically titled "Keeping the Promise," was written by
the persons and agencies that confessed failure." 2 The chair of the
task force, a city attorney, made an understated comment, "[i]t is a
sobering document."' 1 3 The report asserted that domestic violence in
California sends 100,000 children to foster care each year and results
in 169 murders. 114 The basic recommendation of the document was
refreshingly candid: "Enforce the laws that already exist."
'1 15
For purposes of this discussion, one might rephrase that
recommendation slightly: having monopolized family law and
criminal justice, the state must exercise its powers in a responsible
way to create avenues of access to justice for its weakest citizens.
V. CONCLUSION
If one accepts the terms of this argument, conversations about
access to justice might take a shape different from those that have
been dominant over the past few decades. Most commentators
RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, KEEPING THE PROMISE: VICTIM SAFETY
AND BATrERER ACCOUNTABILITY (2005), available at http://www.safestate
.org/documents/dvreport-ag.pdf.
107. Id. at Aiii (Letter from Casey Gwinn, Chair, Attorney Gen.'s Task
Force on Criminal Justice Response to Domestic Violence, to Bill Lockyer,
Attorney Gen., State of Cal.).
108. See id. at 2.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id. at4.
111. Id. at 5-6.
112. Id. app. at 93-101.
113. Mike McKee, AG: Legal System Lax on Preventing Domestic Violence,
RECORDER (S.F., Cal.), July 27, 2005, at 1.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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involved in those conversations have stressed additional funding for
criminal defense rather than prosecution. They also have stressed
additional funding (and fewer restrictions) for high-profile
aggregated claims, such as class actions challenges to various public
and private practices. Again, such a vision of access to justice has
many attractions, and I do not argue against such investments. But I
believe that the claims of the poorest for freedom from violence, and
for control over life's most intimate relation and society's most basic
unit of social life, ought to be strong ones, even for scarce resources.
If this exploration starts, or revives, such a conversation, it will have
more than fulfilled its aim.
718 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:2
